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Hypervelocity Rod Bundles (Rods from God)

Your tax dollars at work, ladies and gentlemen. From the Arms Control Today website;

“The Air Force has considered using weapons for prompt global force projection through space, such as the common aero vehicle and Hypervelocity Rod Bundles (often termed “rods from God”).[7] Such space-based global strike capability would allow the United States to target and strike any point on earth in less than 90 minutes with complete surprise and provide the capability for flexible strikes for different types of targets, such as hard and deeply buried targets or mobile targets.”

The English version is this; the military is spending on the order of Millions of dollars on a project to hang the equivalent of a very pointy Mack Truck from a satellite, and then drop it onto any point on the globe. By the time it hits the ground, it’s going so fast it penetrates to some inane depth. One minute, you’re minding your own business drinking tea. The next minute, there’s a massive hunk of metal hurtling through the ceiling. The ultimate slapstick, only at the end all that’s left of Laural and Hardy is a very flat stain. Compare this to, for example, the money we spend on needle exchange programs. Or head start. Or food stamps.

God [b]less America.

Filthy Lucre

There is a movement to put the face of Ronald Reagan on the $10. Here’s proof. Personally, I think this is insane, as Alexander Hamilton was pretty much the fundamental driving force behind the foundation of the Mint and the Federal Reserve banking system. But hey, whatever. Here’s what I think a Reagan $10 should look like.

For the record, I would be in complete support of a Nixon $10 bill, so long as on the back there was a pinup of Kissinger in drag.

Not Hoover in drag, mind you, as that would be cliché. I mean Kissinger in a cocktail dress, arm in arm with Augusto Pinochet on their way to the debutant ball. That would be a ten spot I would be glad to carry around in my wallet.

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Following is a paper I wrote for a course I’m in at the U of O. It’s about foreign policy. I thought I made some pretty compelling and original arguments. Comments, as always, are welcome. For crying out loud, don’t plagiarize.

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Terrorism alone is one of the most frightening threats faced by the United States today. The consequences of nuclear terrorism are greater by orders of magnitude. One need only imagine the devastation that even a small nuclear device would wreak on New York City to know that the consequences of nuclear terrorism would far outweigh what took place on September 11, 2001. Thankfully while the consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack are high, the likelihood is low. Furthermore, by taking very simple precautionary measures we could reduce that likelihood substantially (1). The measures that should be undertaken are focused in three areas. They are; enhancing the security of existing nuclear weapons and fissile material, disrupting the activities of violent extremist groups worldwide, and securing points of entry to the United States including borders, sea-ports, and airports. The first of these three policies is clearly aimed at nuclear WMD rather than chemical or biological. The inclusion of chemical and biological weapons under the same ‘WMD’ heading as nuclear weapons is problematic because the level of damage they can cause and the likelihood of their being used are much lower (2). The second two policies are aimed at controlling the spread of terrorism around the globe, and specifically keeping terrorists out of the US. If terrorists are unable to operate generally, they will be unable to operate in terms of WMD in particular. My concern is primarily with nuclear terrorism taking place in a U.S. city, as its consequences are by far the worst.

Securing Nuclear Material (3)

In terms of securing nuclear material, I will argue that the first priority should be securing former Soviet assets. Lesser priorities deal with emerging proliferators like Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. We should strengthen and expand the Nunn-Lugar programs to prevent unintentional transmission to terrorists. Classical deterrence, accompanied by an investment in improving nuclear forensics, will prevent states from giving nuclear material to terrorists (4).

First Priority; Secure Material from Theft

The first step in securing loose nuclear material is strengthening and expanding the scope of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs that began with the Nunn Lugar legislation in 1991. These programs were meant to assist the governments of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in controlling nuclear material and expertise. While they have met with considerable successes, they have been under-funded and have moved sluggishly even since the attacks of 9/11/01 (5).

We should allocate additional resources to the CTR programs, and should expand the scale and scope of those programs to ensure that all nuclear material everywhere is securely guarded against internal or external theft. The other priorities of the CTR programs are important, especially in terms of making sure the former nuclear experts of the FSU don’t go to work elsewhere (6). The most important aspect of the programs, however, is securing lose nuclear material as this material is the most likely source for a terrorist bomb. Sadly, CTR programs have consistently faced political and ideological hurdles in securing needed funding and authorization (7). Congress must agree that controlling loose nuclear material is more important than ideological maneuvering.

Second Priority; Deter Nuclear Sharing

Strengthening CTR only works to prevent nuclear material from slipping through State’s fingers unintentionally. It does nothing to prevent States from giving a nuclear weapon to terrorists on purpose. Many states support terrorism, both for ideological and strategic reasons. It is of the utmost importance that we prevent any state from intentionally transferring a nuclear weapon to a terrorist organization. The way to accomplish this is through deterrence, and a deep investment in new nuclear forensic technology, and international cooperation to make sure that samples of fissile materials are available for forensic comparison (8). Accompanying a highly accurate ability to determine the source of any nuclear attack must be the clearly stated threat that, in the event of an incident of nuclear terrorism, any state found to be complicit would find itself subject to massive nuclear retaliation. This combination of a publicly known capability to correctly attribute the source of a nuclear explosion and a credible threat of extreme retaliation would deter stable states from abetting potential nuclear terrorists.

Third Priority; Everybody Stay Calm

The threat of nuclear retaliation would only deter states that expect their own continued existence in the absence of nuclear retaliation. A state targeted for regime change by the U.S. is likely to calculate that their own regime’s destruction is inevitable and may decide to inflict as much damage as possible against their enemy as a move of desperation. It is feasible that a nuclear North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, or another hypothetical new nuclear state that is about to succumb to regime change might pass a nuclear weapon to terrorists for delivery as a final ‘hail Mary pass’.

The U.S. should renounce preemptive war or regime change as a policy option, and pledge to work through normal diplomacy to deal with regimes whose interests are not in line with our own. This stance will also greatly increase the possibility of international cooperation, which is important in many aspects of controlling the terrorism/WMD threat, and especially important in creating a reliable database for nuclear forensics (9).

Disrupting Terrorist Networks

Regarding the investigation and disruption of terrorist networks, I will argue that police and detective methods will by and large be more effective than military methods (10). The current war in Iraq was ostensibly started in an effort to address the potential confluence of terrorism and WMD, although no such link existed (11). The aftermath of this military strategy has done little to diminish, and has possibly even increased the chances that terrorists will gain a WMD capability (12). Likewise, even the widely supported military action against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan has led to a dispersion of the network, making them harder to track and stop (13). Police, detective, and intelligence methods that have been used to track and stop terrorist activities have, by contrast, netted many successes (14).

Law enforcement methods are more appropriate to the struggle against terrorists than military means. Many of the rules that apply to law enforcement should be followed in dealing with terrorists. The extraordinary powers that have been used threaten due process rights (15). Such a trade off might be worthwhile if the use of military methods was radically more effective against terrorists, but it is not. I grant that in certain limited circumstances investigating terrorist activity and stopping attacks requires more lenient rules of investigation than are guaranteed in criminal circumstances (16). Nonetheless, investigating terrorists and attempting to learn of their plans is an investigative process. The chaos and destruction wrought by war make investigation much more difficult, and allow potential targets to disperse. Also, war fighting detracts from our international reputation, which makes cooperation on other essential non-proliferation tasks more difficult.

We should refocus our efforts and resources toward tracking terrorist operatives and cells and trying to learn of their plans before they have been put into effect. We should treat terrorism as a criminal act or as an asymmetrical armed conflict, but not as a war (17). While military strikes against terrorists have been questionably effective at preventing nuclear terrorism, intelligence and detective work penetrated the A.Q. Kahn proliferation network “rather easily” (18). The most important task in the war on terror is preventing terrorist attacks, and the most effective way to do this is to infiltrate terrorist cells and gather human intelligence. Resources spent on military operations in the war on terror are quite often resources wasted.

In 2005, the U.S. intelligence budget was around $44 billion according to high placed intelligence officials (19). By contrast, the total direct cost of the war in Iraq has been estimated at around $500 billion in 2006, three years after the hostilities began. The indirect costs of that war have been estimated as high as 2.239 trillion dollars (20). Even looking at the smaller direct cost estimate, it’s clear that more resources are being devoted to direct military action than to intelligence gathering. These ratios need to be reversed.

Securing Ports and Borders

In protecting our borders and points of entry, the U.S. faces enormous challenges. Hopefully the first two strategies presented will prevent terrorists from obtaining a nuclear weapon, or catch them in their planning phases before they are able to deliver a nuclear attack. As a last resort, we need to do more to deny terrorists entry to the U.S. Hundreds of millions of people, as well as tens of millions of trucks and shipping containers of cargo, crossed U.S. borders in 2000. There is no conceivable way that all cross border traffic can be fully inspected (21). We need to make hard choices to redirect our border security energy where it is the most likely to do some good. This means that our Border Patrol should focus less on migrant workers and economic refugees looking for a better life, and should be tasked with tracking and stopping terrorists instead.
One could fairly describe the problems at our points of entry (ports and borders, including unofficial crossing points) as an inability to filter legal from illegal traffic. This inability could be costly (22). We need to develop redundant systems that check cargo in our international shipping and transportation systems at multiple points before they enter the U.S. This project will inevitably involve international cooperation (23). Using modern data mining techniques, we should analyze prior smuggling attempts, terrorist threats, and shipping in general to detect patterns and direct searches.

We should also consider our priorities in terms of protecting our points of entry. Obviously there is quite a lot of illegal traffic crossing the U.S./Mexico border that is unrelated to terrorism. Because so much of this traffic is able to get through, we can safely assume that the Border Patrol is unable to stop all illegal border traffic, and because no organization can net 100% success, it is to be expected that some people would slip through.

The problem that illegal transborder traffic poses is that it would be relatively easy for a terrorist to slip across the border along with a group of economic migrants. It further stands to reason that the border patrol will be better able to catch terrorists and other transborder criminals if they are less focused on economic migration. I therefore suggest that we reapportion border patrol resources away from stopping economic migrants and toward stopping traffic that is crossing with malign intent toward the U.S. Of course, in order to separate the two types of border traffic, we would have to establish a system for migrants to enter the country legally. The system must be sufficiently lenient and simple as to eliminate any incentive for job seekers to cross illegally, but also that incorporates biometric data and background checks rigorous enough to ensure that terrorists are not entering the country through legal channels.

Conclusion: What Not to Do

In conclusion, I’d like to simply mention several things that I have not suggested. We should not build missile defensea. The chances of a terrorist attempting to attack us with an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile are extraordinarily low. The chances of a missile defense system actually working are also extremely low. If we were somehow able to get such a system to work, the consequence of our having it would likely be the end of deterrence as we know it and thusly the probability of new nuclear arms races and perhaps even the unthinkable; total nuclear war. This is clearly, and beyond the shadow of a doubt, too high a price to pay for the illusion of security provided by an extremely expensive system that doesn’t actually work.

We should not engage in preventative wars or wars of aggression. We should not use our military as a policy tool. The war in Iraq has created a chaotic, lawless environment that is perfect for terrorist recruitment and training. It has turned world opinion (especially in the Islamic regions) strongly against the United States. It has reinforced ideas of the U.S. as an imperial power that uses ‘human rights’ rhetoric to cover a cynical, adventuristic foreign policy.

We should not allow important arms control treaties to expire, and should respect world opinion. In order to achieve our anti-terrorism goals we need to be able to work jointly with other world powers, great and small. Such cooperation is impossible in an atmosphere of American power projection and dominance. We should let go of our self claimed role as the world’s only ’superpower’ and agree to join the community of nations on equal terms.

We must undertake the steps I have suggested above; securing lose nuclear material, using our best investigative and intelligence gathering capabilities against terrorists in their planning phases, and refocus our border control resources where they are most in need. We also need to avoid taking courses of action that hurt our position in the world. The next administration has the opportunity to implement this sort of foreign policy against Terrorism and WMD. It is essential that we, the voters, choose an administration that will follow a responsible, well thought out course.

Footnotes

(1) See Bunn, “A Mathematical Model for the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism”, page 108 for an in depth discussion of the likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism. He estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack at .29 over ten years. He suggests that we could reduce the likelihood to .08 (or even as low as .01) over ten years by taking steps to reduce the likelihood of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon. I feel that he has overestimated some probabilities, for example he estimates that the probability that terrorists could convert acquired fissile materials into a usable nuclear capability at .4, which is hardly a non-controversial assumption. Others, like Mueller, would probably make a much lower estimate of that variable. Nonetheless, his model is fascinating and the idea that we could reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism so drastically is heartening.

(2) See Mueller and Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction”, page 43.

(3) Throughout this paper I will use the term ‘nuclear material’ to refer jointly to nuclear weapons and fissile material.

(4) See Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11” page 25. She argues that deterrence will prevent states from giving or allowing terrorists to get nuclear weapons. Her argument is persuasive only to the degree that nations are capable of keeping their nuclear stockpiles out of terrorists’ hands. Deterrence cannot force a nation to do something of which they are incapable. Therefore, our technical assistance is required to secure nuclear material when the countries that possess it are in periods of upheaval and are unable to manage it themselves.

(5) See Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, page 132.

(6) See Kucia, “Lugar, Hunter Lock Horns on Threat Reduction,” page 34.

(7) Ibid.

(8) See Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11” pages 27-29.

(9) See Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11” page 29.

(10) For a dissenting viewpoint, see Rice, “Promoting the National Interest” page 47. This article was written during the 2000 campaign, before the 9/11 attacks. She argues that the U.S. needs to “deal decisively” with the confluence of rogue regimes, terrorists, and WMD. She seems to suggest that military options are warranted to prevent this confluence. My feeling (expressed in the prior section) is that deterrence alone will prevent rogue regimes from either using WMD or giving them to terrorists. Therefore there is no need to use military force preemptively, as Rice seems to be saying.

(11) See Freedman, “War in Iraq: Selling the Threat”, Page 9.

(12) Ibid. Page 38.

(13) See Guanaratna, “Post-9/11 Evolution of Al Qaeda”, page 528.

(14) Ibid. page 526.

(15) See Roth, “The Law of War in the War on Terror”, page 2. This article makes the case that law enforcement rules rather than war fighting rules should be used in the war on terror.

(16) See Wedgwood, “Fighting a War Under Its Rules”, pages 126-127, which is a reply to Roth.

(17) See Mueller, Overblown, pages 7-8. I believe that Mueller underestimates the danger of nuclear terrorism. His arguments about the extremely low likelihood of nuclear terrorism are highly compelling. However, I feel that he fails to adequately take the phenomenally dire consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack into account in his assessment of risk.

(18) Ibid, page 16

(19) See Shane, “Official Reveals Budget for U.S. Intelligence”, page 1.

(20) See Blimes and Stiglitz, “The Economic Costs of the Iraq War”, pages 2 and 30.

(21) See Flynn, “America the Vulnerable”, page 64 for an exhaustive list of border traffic.

(22) Ibid, page 68.

(23) Ibid, page 70.

Bibliography

Bunn, Matthew “A Mathmatical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism”, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2006; Vol. 607; p.103

Mueller, John and Mueller, Karl, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction”, Foreign Affairs, 1999; 78:3; p.43

Talmadge, Caitlin, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11”, The Washington Quarterly 2007; 30:2; p.21

Allison, Graham, “How to Stop Nuclear Terror”, Foreign Affairs, 2004; 83:1; p.64

Allison, Graham, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophy, Owl Books, 2004

Kucia, Christine, “Lugar, Hunter Lock Horns on Threat Reduction”, Arms Control Today, 2003; 33:3; p. 34

Rice, Condoleezza, “Promoting the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs, 2000; 79:1; p. 45

Gunaratna, Rohan, “Post-9/11 Evolution of Al Qaeda”, Intelligence and Security Informatics, 2004; Proceedings 3073; p. 526

Roth, Kenneth, “The Law of War in the War on Terror”, Foreign Affairs, 2004; 83:2; p. 2

Wedgwood, Ruth, “Fighting a War Under Its Rules”, Foreign Affairs, 2004; 83:3; p. 126

Mueller, John, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, Free Press, 2006

Shane, Scott, “Official Reveals Budget for U.S. Intelligence”, New York Times, November 8, 2005, A18

Blimes, Linda and Stiglitz, Joseph, “The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict”, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 12054, February 2006

Flynn, Stephan, “America the Vulnerable”, Foreign Affairs, 2002; 81:1, p. 60

Existential Crisis Averted (I Think)

If you look back a few posts you will see a long winded, self obsessed rant about an existential crisis that I have been working through this term. I’m pretty sure that this is a standard crisis for people who are leaving the safe, theoretical environment of a University and wanting to make a positive difference in the dangerous, practical real world. I think I’ve pretty much worked things out for myself in the short term. If I can take work that lets me make society slightly better every day, I think that will do for now. At least I’m not throwing my energy into something that makes life worse, and people are really suffering now. The problem with changing the system in fundamental ways is that it’s a crap-shoot, and there are all manner of completely unpredictable consequences that you have to take into account. So, I think I’m coming down on the side of incrementalism, doing little things to make the whole slightly better in controllable ways rather than radical things to make the whole as close to ideal as possible all at once but with the possibility of unforeseen consequences blowing up in your face and making things worse in the long run. Maybe I’ll change my mind again one day, and I’m still in favor of some pretty sweeping changes to the way we do politics. What’s changed is that I can feel good in a job that isn’t directly aimed at radical change (which is good, because there aren’t a lot of those jobs out there). I can feel good in a job that makes a few people feel better and takes small steps toward a better world.

Am I a total sellout?

Take This, Italy!

For the past several days, I’ve been spending every spare minute reading thickly written information about political economies because I’m writing a final essay. As I’ve worked myself harder, I find that more and more often I come to a point where I realize that I’ve been reading away happily and not paying a lick of attention to what’s in front of me. This was going on just now, I was reading an article by Michael Piore (a very famous political economist) when I was roused from my reverie by the following sentence;

The form of fashion may originate in Italy, but the symbolic content of fashion, ranging from blue jeans to baseball caps, tattoos, and ear piercing, originate in the black ghettos and gay discos of the United States.

I’m not entirely sure what relevance this has to the article I’m reading about new versus old structures in the economy. Needless to say, I’m about to go back and find out, but I thought first I’d share this special experience with, well with no one.